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BEHIND THE VEIL 
THE REFORM OF ISLAM IN INTER-WAR ALBANIA 
OR THE SEARCH FOR A “MODERN”  AND “EUROPEAN” ISLAM 
 
Nathalie Clayer 
 
The Albanian case is unique. When the independence of this young European 
country was again recognized by the International Community in 1920,1 Islam was 
the religion of the majority of the population (around 70% of an estimated 
800,000 inhabitants). Albania was thus the only predominantly Muslim European 
state. Unlike the majority of Muslims in Western Europe, Albanian Muslims were 
neither immigrants nor recent converts to Islam. Nor did they form a “surviving 
minority,”2 as was the case with Muslim groups living in other Balkan countries ; 
rather we could say that they made up a “surviving majority.” One of the 
components of the national identity building process had been to legitimize the 
existence of a sovereign nation, even if predominantly Muslim, in Europe, in case 
of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.3  
Despite this Muslim majority, from 1920 onwards the Albanian state was 
immediately defined by its political leaders as afetar (“without religion”), that is 
to say “without any official religion”. The aim was to strengthen national feeling 
among a population divided between different denominations, Muslims, Catholic 
Christians and Orthodox Christians.4 In fact, the state was multi-denominational 
rather than a-denominational. The “a-denominational” character of the state also 
fitted the wishes of secularist intellectuals and civil servants, who were non-
Muslims as well as Muslims – Sunnis or members of the heterodox Islamic 
brotherhood of the Bektashis. These secularists dominated the intellectual life and 
the state apparatus, and were working for what they called the “modernization” 
and the “Europeanization” of the country. 
The dominant role of secularist elites paved the way for the “reform of 
Islam.” This process was made easier by the nationalization of the Islamic 
                                                 
1 Albania was first recognized by the European powers as an independent principality in 1913, but 
it was occupied by different countries during the First World War. 
2 The expression is from Xavier Bougarel. 
3 See my forthcoming book Aux origines du nationalisme albanais. La naissance d‟une nation 
majoritairement musulmane en Europe. 
4 Approximately 20% of the population were Orthodox Christians, mainly in the South of the 
country, and 10% Catholic Christians, mainly in the Northern part. 
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religious institutions and by the progressive control exerted over them by the state. 
Indeed, the Albanian state played an important role in the organization and reform 
of official religious institutions. For example, it interfered in the organization of 
the first national Islamic Congress which took place in 1923, issuing orders 
concerning the choice of the delegates. It was not essential that they were clerics, 
but above all they had to be “patriots” and “more or less liberal.” The civil 
authorities themselves even choose some of the delegates, who were supposed to 
represent one province or another.5 Government representatives were also present 
during the meetings. Apart from the congresses, the political view of clerics was 
closely controlled. Their nomination had to be accepted, and was sometimes even 
decided by the civil authorities who also dismissed some of clerics. Finally, with 
the further reform and centralization of religious institutions in 1929, the state 
came to provide a substantial part of the Islamic Community‟s budget.6 
The “reform of Islam” was also facilitated by the fact that the authority of the 
official religious leaders was sometimes even imposed through the intervention of 
the civil authorities. For instance, in 1926 the head of the Islamic Community 
informed the Ministry of the Interior that a propaganda had been launched in 
Shkodër against the New Madrasa established in that city, as well as against the 
new organization of the Jemaat and the collection of money that it implied. The 
Ministry therefore ordered the head of the Community not to allow sermons to be 
delivered in mosques without the authorization of the Community, and promised 
that the civil authorities would taken action against offenders.7  
The links between the political authorities and the Islamic Community were 
especially close since Islam and the Islamic religious institutions were also used 
by the government for social control. As early as 1922, sermons (vaz) were used to 
persuade parents to send their children to school, and to strengthen national 
fraternity and loyalty to the government. Even in 1936, the official aim of the 
Islamic Community was to contribute by means of sermons and lectures to the 
strengthening of national fraternity and national feeling, as well as to advise 
Muslims to conform to progress and “true civilization.” Islam was also 
particularly used in the context of the economic crisis. During Ramadan in 1931, 
for example, preachers had to address this problem, and Islamic charity was 
                                                 
5 Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit (AQSh), Tirana, Fondi 152 (Ministri e puneve të Brendshme), Viti 1923, 
Dosja 31, fl. 1-3.  
6 See for example AQSh F. 152, V. 1925, D. 623 ; F. 882 (Komuniteti Mysliman), V. 1929, D. 3 ; 
Statuti i Komunitetit Mysliman Shqipëtar, Tiranë, 1929. In this text, “Community” with a capital 
letter refers to an institution and not to a group of people.  
7 AQSh, F. 882, V. 1926, D. 90, fl. 17-26. 
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encouraged in order to help solve the social crisis. In 1937, the leaders of the 
Islamic Community called upon wealthy Muslims to give to the poor who were 
suffering from unemployment in order to show that there was no need for 
socialism and bolshevism. Indeed, Islam was certainly considered by the Albanian 
political authorities as a tool against the diffusion of Communist ideas, which, at 
that time, were attractive especially for young people.8 The “harmful nature” of 
Communism was denounced by Muslim clerics in numerous articles and 
booklets.9 
 
Among the “reforms of Islam” that were introduced in this context, we should 
mention firstly the autonomy granted to the Sufi brotherhoods, in particular to the 
Bektashiyya, which had already been promoted by some Albanian nationalists at 
the end of the Ottoman period as a liberal form of Islam. These changes, imposed 
by the political power against the wishes of the leaders of the Islamic Community, 
were quite different from the developments taking place in Turkey where Sufi 
orders were banned. Nevertheless, from 1936 onwards, four Sufi networks – the 
Kadiriyya, the Rifaiyya, the Sadiyya and the Tijaniyya – were grouped within a 
special organization, under the umbrella of the Islamic Community.10 
Another important reform was the suppression of the Shari‟a courts, 
following the adoption of the Civil Code in 1928-1929. Their abolition was only 
reluctantly accepted by the leaders of the Islamic Community because it erased the 
religious character of marriages and introduced some provisions concerning 
inheritance and divorce that were contrary to the Sacred Law. On the other hand, 
other reforms proposed by the political authorities were well accepted, because 
they were in accordance with the ideas promoted by reformist ulemas.11 Thus, in 
1929, all the provincial madrasas were closed down and a new General Madrasa 
                                                 
8 AQSH, F. 882, V. 1922, D. 10, fl. 26 ; V. 1931, D. 106, fl. 3-4 ; V. 1936, D. 53, fl. 1 ; Zani i 
naltë (Tiranë), XII/2, February 1937, p. 34. In 1937, measures were taken by the political 
authorities against Communist groups (cf. Michael Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der 
Königsdiktatur in Albanien (1912-1939), Munich: Oldenbourg 1987, p. 262). 
9 The most significant work in this respect was that of Hafiz Ali Korça (Bolshevizma. Çkatërimi i 
njerëzimit [Bolshevism. The destruction of humanity], Tirana 1925). From 1933-34 on, atheism 
was one of the main targets of the Islamic Community in its journal. See also the booklet of Hafiz 
Ali Kraja (A duhet feja. A e pengon bashkimin kombëtar [Is Religion necessary. Does it prevent 
the national union], Shkodër 1934).  
10 Nathalie Clayer, L‟Albanie, pays des derviches, Berlin : Otto Harrassowitz 1990. About the 
reactions of the Muslim religious leaders, see for example AQSh, F. 882, v. 1923, D. 1.  
11 As in Turkey, religious reformists and political reformers had a common goal, to elaborate a 
“true spiritual Islam,” cleansed of its impurities.  
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was set up in the capital, in order to train a new staff of religious officials, in a 
“modern” spirit.12  
However, by using the example of another reform, the ban on the veil, I want 
to highlight the mechanisms of such reforms and the relations between the various 
actors involved. More generally, I want to show how these mechanisms reveal the 
place of Islam within Albanian society during the inter-war period.  
 
The progressive lifting of the veil 
The ban on the veil only occurred step by step.13 Between 1920 and 1928, 
such a reform was only evoked or asked for by some actors – intellectuals and 
politicians – in the press or in parliament, particularly when important political 
decisions were to be taken. This was the case between 1920 and 1923, a period 
which represents the beginning of a difficult state building process.14 This was 
also the case in 1924, during the short government of Fan Noli, established after 
the so-called “June Revolution.” The question was again debated in 1928, when 
the Civil Code was introduced and when the political system was transformed 
from a republic to a monarchy. But during this first phase, no action was actually 
taken, either by the political authorities, or by religious leaders. 
In 1929, at a time of political change and of religious re-organization under 
state control, however, the ban on the veil became part of the radical measures 
requested by Behxhet Shapati, the new head of the Islamic Community, elected at 
the close of the national Islamic Congress. Indeed, it has been suggested that B. 
Shapati  asked the Minister of Justice to ban the perçe (veil) and requested that, 
through the police, he advice the population to abandon the veil by prohibiting 
husbands and fathers to go in the company of veiled women.15 However, it seems 
doubtful that the new head of the Islamic Community would have taken this 
initiative which was probably the work of the political authorities. Indeed, the 
                                                 
12 See Alexandre Popovic, L‟islam balkanique, Berlin: Otto Harrassowitz 1986, pp. 27 ss. 
13 Here the discussion will be on the veil (perçe in Albanian), covering the face, and not on the 
headscarf. At that time, in Albania, the veil was worn by urban women, whereas in the countryside 
it was quite rare.  
14 In 1923, following a proposition of Ali Këlcyra, a deputy from Southern Albania, the President 
of the Albanian Parliament proposed a vote concerning a recommendation to the government to 
make propaganda through the Islamic Congress in order to improve the social life of women, 
taking Turkey as an example. But the proposition was not never put to the vote (Bisedimet e 
këshillit Kombtar, viti III, n°4, Tiranë, 1923, pp. 49-57).  
15 Fatmira Musaj, Gruaja në Shqipëri [The woman in Albania] (1912-1939), Tiranë:Akademia e 
Shkencave 2002, pp. 306-307. 
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ministerial Council banned not only the perçe (veil), but also the ferexhe (a 
dustcoat worn by women when they went out). The Minister of Justice 
nevertheless recommended to police stations that they should be very careful not 
to offend the people, and to try to convince them by working together with the 
district councils responsible for explaining to women why the ban was 
necessary.16 
At the same time, during the following years, the political authorities used 
various means in order to impose this decision : propaganda in newspapers, 
lectures and, above all, to insist that women working for the state, such as 
midwifes and teachers, comply. In fact, at least in 1935, punitive measures were 
taken against those women who did not respect the ban.17 In addition, initiatives 
were sometimes taken by local authorities, such as the mayors of Gjirokastër and 
Tirana.18 
But the question of the ban on the veil gained new impetus in 1936-1937, 
during a new period of political crisis. At that time, the country‟s sovereignty was 
more and more openly challenged by Italy. A liberal government had been set up 
in October 1935, but lasted only until November 1936. During this “liberal 
government” led by Mehdi Frashëri, the debate on the veil was relaunched in the 
press, especially between the Islamic Community‟s journal and the newspapers of 
some young intellectuals. Then, in 1937, when an important set of reforms was 
launched by the Albanian authorities to assert the country‟s sovereignty, the ban 
on the veil became the subject of a law.  
Here again, the initiative was supposed to have been taken by the official 
religious authorities. According to this version, the two muftis of the Southern 
provinces asked the General Council of the Islamic Community to ban the veil. 
Following this request, the head of the Islamic Community, B. Shapati, wrote a 
report, containing among others a fatwa by him stating that, it was not haram 
(forbidden by religion), for a woman to show her face. On 1st March 1937, the 
General Council of the Community agreed with this report and the fatwa, and 
decided to make the decision known on one hand to the population by means of 
sermons, and on the other to the government. The latter immediately presented a 
draft law to parliament that was approved on 8th March 1937. Under the title 
« Law on the ban on face covering », it stipulated that it was forbidden for a 
woman to cover her face, totally or partially, with any kind of veil. The offenders, 
                                                 
16 Ibid., pp. 309-310. 
17 Ibid., p. 311. 
18 Ibid. 
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as well as the husbands, fathers or guardians who had not exerted their authority 
and those who were making a propaganda in favor of the veil, incurred a fine.19  
In reality, this initiative probably originated in political circles, and it seems 
that a kind of compromise was achieved between the political and the religious 
authorities. Indeed, the law concerned only the covering of the face and remained 
silent about the wearing of the ferexhe, a garment that the police was supposed to 
have banned since 1929. 
What is important to note is that this law had a strong echo abroad, and this 
had certainly been the true aim of the political authority. In fact, the ban on the 
veil aimed at symbolizing the westernization of the country, by making it possible 
for women to have a place in economic and social life. As a Western country, 
Albania should be a sovereign country among the other Western countries.20 
However, in the country itself, the veil did not totally disappear for two 
reasons. On one hand, there was popular opposition and, on the other, the 
government remained very cautious. A resistance developed especially in Shkodër, 
the stronghold of Islam in Northern Albania, and in small cities of Central 
Albania, such as Tirana, Kavajë, Elbasan and Durrës. Despite the example given 
by high religious officials and the order given to civil servants concerning their 
wives, the veil reappeared after a short period. In some places, women began to 
wear a xhari, a piece of material which allowed them to uncover their face when 
meeting a policeman, and quickly to recover it afterwards. Still in 1940, problems 
were noticed in Kavajë by the civil authorities.21 In fact, these authorities had 
received instructions that when applying the law they should not act brutally. 
Politically, it was better to convince than to forbid. At the beginning of the 
campaign, King Zog had sent his three sisters unveiled to Shkodër, along with the 
Minister of the Interior and other officials, in order to convince the 
population.22 Persuasion was also part of the programme of the Albanian Woman 
Association‟s local groups, that were in charge of the organization of 
conferences.23  
 
                                                 
19 Zani i naltë [The supreme voice], XII/3, March 1937, pp. 65-73. The law was published in the 
Official Journal (Fletorja Zyrtare, Tiranë, XVI/15, 10/3/1937, p. 1).  
20 A special file in the archives of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is devoted to the 
articles collected in the press of various countries on that reform launched in Albania (AQSh, F. 
151, V. 1937, D. 75). See F. Musaj, op.cit., pp. 319-321. 
21 F. Musaj, op.cit., pp. 316-319 ; AQSh, F. 882, V. 1937, D. 88, fl.1 ; F. 152, V. 1940, D. 86. 
22 B. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, New York:Columbia Univ. Press 
1984, p. 249.  
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The debate and its actors 
A multiplicity of actors, with various positions and interests, were involved in 
this reform, as well as in the debate that surrounded it. There were three categories 
of actors, all of whom had to take into account the fact that the population was 
severely affected by the economic and social crisis and that religion was an 
important reference for the people. These categories, which were not always very 
clearly separated, were : state representatives, secularist intellectuals and Muslim 
clerics. In fact, these different actors together represented only a tiny proportion of 
the population. As in the case of the question of the Civil Code, some non-
Muslims participated in the debate, while they interfered to a lesser extent in other 
reforms of Islam. Nevertheless, the main actors remained Muslims. This reveals 
that the social division implied by the multi-denominational character of the 
population was still very important, except for a section of the younger 
generation.24   
 
The state representatives 
The state representatives did not intervene much in the debate, but they 
played an important role in the field, because they were responsible for the 
enforcement of the ban at different levels. In general, the policy they had to 
implement was dictated by a desire for reform. The aim was to “modernize” the 
country, but above all to built a “faithful nation” and to assert the sovereignty of 
the country. However, in concrete terms, the realization of this policy was 
changing with time and circumstances. Furthermore, the civil servants in charge of 
its implementation had their own views that could have an impact upon their 
actions. Mayors, officials, teachers, policemen could act locally according to their 
own feeling, either enforcing or not the orders received from above.  
Some of the state representatives were Muslim conservatives who were 
against the ban. In this case they could be still “more cautious” vis-à-vis the 
population in implementing the ban. But it seems that, as officials, they were often 
obliged to set an example. It seems also that, in fact, most of the civil servants 
even anticipated the government initiatives ; I have already referred to the local 
initiatives in favor of the ban taken in 1929 by the mayor of Gjirokastër. He asked 
                                                                                                                                     
23 F. Musaj, op.cit., p. 302. 
24 On the political level too, religious diversity was marked. Members of parliament represented 
proportionally the denominational composition of the population. 
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the city‟s population to abandon the veil, because it was the cause of women‟s 
isolation.25 Teachers, especially those belonging the younger generation, were 
often more eager for reforms than the government itself. In particular, some of 
them seem to have called for a clearer and quicker disappearance of religion, and 
especially of Islam, from the public sphere.26 This was the case for non-Muslims, 
but also for young Muslims trained in Western countries or in new schools in 
Albania. Their attitude reflects both the social competition in which they were 
involved vis-à-vis the older elites and especially the clerics who had previously 
exerted a monopoly over education, and the effects of ideas developed by 
secularist intellectuals.27  
 
The secularist intellectuals 
The secularist intellectuals, who voiced opposition to the veil in the press (or 
in the parliament) from 1920 onwards, were often guided by a European-centered 
vision of Islam. They used the question of the veil as a component in the debate on 
“modernization,” “Westernization,” “secularization” and strengthening of the 
state. They generally belonged to the younger generation. Most of them were of 
Muslim origin, but others were Christians. However, as they were all secularist, 
their religious origin did not matter so much. Among non-Muslims, there was no 
specific discourse, even if for them secularization meant not only the separation of 
state and religion, but also the end of the hegemony of Islam in society.28 The 
young Albanians of Muslim origin who took the floor had a different profile. 
Some were born in important notable families, such as Ali Këlcyra and Namik 
Delvina. They had studied in the West or in Istanbul, in modern schools where 
positivism was quite widespread. Other secularist intellectuals were of more 
modest social origin. They had studied in Western Europe or in Albania. Some of 
them were attracted by communism, such as Halim Xhelo and Selim Shpuza.29 
                                                 
25 F. Musaj, op.cit., pp. 308-309. 
26 In April 1928, the cadi of Delvinë (in the South-West of the country) complained that the 
director of a primary school was opposing the teaching of religion at school (AQSh, F. 882, V. 
1928, D. 95). 
27 See, for example the case of Safet Butka (1901-1943), trained in Austria (Uran Butka, Safet 
Butka, Tiranë 2003, cf. pp. 31-34 and 98). 
28 In September 1924, the editors of a Catholic newspaper in Shkodër asked the Democratic 
government to ban the veil in the name of democracy, politics and morality (Ora e maleve, II/37, 
6/9/1924, p. 3).  
29 The set of articles which I took into consideration is that used by F. Musaj for the period 1922-
1923, with articles from the journal Drita (Gjirokastër, edited by a Muslim), Agimi (Shkodër, 
edited by a Catholic), Mbrojtja kombtare (Halim Xhelo) and Kombi në rrezik (Musaj, op.cit., p. 
 115 
However, they all were fighting against the “Eastern mentality and habits,” and 
wanted their country to turn to the West, even though they were debating how to 
do this and some of them were trying to build a specifically Albanian way to 
“westernization.”30 
For the secularist intellectuals, the veil (as well as the ferexhe) was linked 
with notions of seclusion, servitude and slavery of women. It was associated, not 
with the outside Muslim world as in the current debate concerning the veil in 
Western Europe, but with the Ottoman past, seen as synonymous with “yoke,” 
“barbarism,” “backwardness,” “fanaticism” and “Asia.” It was also closely 
associated with the socio-political decline of the Islamic community and the 
backwardness of the nation. Indeed the veil was described by such intellectuals as 
the cause of the backwardness of the whole nation, because Muslims were the 
majority of the population, and because girls were not educated and did not 
participate sufficiently in economic life. But, for them, the question was not only 
intrinsic. There was also the problem of foreign perceptions, and concern that the 
first impressions gained by “European tourists” (as they wrote) would be to see 
veiled women in all Albanian cities. 
These intellectuals considered that the ban on the veil was necessary in order 
to make Albania a European country or at least to portray it as such. It could lead 
Albania towards progress and show that Albanians deserved to live as a free 
people in the middle of Europe. They considered that the geographical location of 
Albania in Europe, as well as the fact that the country was living in the 20
th
 
century, were two reasons for the ban on the veil. 
Lastly, they used the example given by Kemalist Turkey, or by other Muslim 
countries (like Iran and Afghanistan), which had made similar reforms. For 
instance, in 1923, the deputy Ali Këlcyra declared in the middle of the Albanian 
Parliament that Mustafa Kemal went to the Turkish Parliament with his unveiled 
fiancée and that newspaper photographs showed the faces of Mustafa Kemal and 
“his wife.” 31 
                                                                                                                                     
140-143). Among the most important texts I used are also texts published in the newspaper Zëri i 
popullit, from Korçë in March 1923 (n°28) and in March-April 1924 (29/3 and 6/4), articles 
published in Shqipëria e re, in Rumania, in April 1925 ; various articles from Namik Delvina 
published in his newspaper Ora in 1932 (see n°541,544, 561) ; articles written by Mehdi Frashëri 
quoted below, as well as some of his texts published in the journals Illyria in 1934 and Minerva in 
1935 ; two articles published in Arbënia (n°209 et n°256 of 1936) ; and the article of Selim Shpuza 
published in 1936 in the journal Bota e re, under the title « Modernism and çarçaf » (n°7). 
30 In 1934, the journal Illyria (n°38, 11/1/1936, p. 1), explained that it was necessary to form a 
front against Eastern influences, and to assimilate the Western mentality, not by importing it, but 
by creating an Albanian culture. 
31 Bisedimet e këshillit Kombtar, viti III, n°3, Tiranë 1923, p. 48. 
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The case of Mehdi Frashëri 
Among this group of secularist intellectuals, the figure of Mehdi Frashëri 
occupied a specific place. Deputy, civil servant, minister, president of the Council 
of State and intellectual, he was one of the main officials responsible for the 
autonomy of the Bektashi Community, which he represented in 1943-1944 on the 
Regency Council, being himself a Bektashi Muslim. He was also one of the main 
architects of the Civil Code introduced in 1928-1929 in Albania.32 
In 1928, the question of the veil enabled him to contrast Bektashism, 
portrayed as “liberal,” with Sunnism, presented as “fanatical” and the enemy of 
progress. Indeed, in the introduction of his book about the Ancient History of 
Albania, he tackled the question of religion. He depicted Sunnism as a fanatical 
form of Islam, which considered every type of progress and every change as a 
threat to religion, while presenting Bektashism as a “protest” against this type of 
Islam. According to Mehdi Frashëri, Bektashism prohibited polygamy and, 
whereas Sunni Islam required women to be veiled, Bektashis considered that 
women had to be veiled only with the “veil of honour,” which was not a material 
veil. Women therefore were only required to be honorable, and were not required 
to cover their face.33  
In a long text published the same year as a serial in a newspaper aimed at 
“intellectuals and patriots,” Mehdi Frashëri explained his ideas about “Muslim 
reforms.”34 He presented the position of the woman and the question of the veil, as 
well as the perception of Christians by Muslims, as the two revealing factors of 
the evolution of Islam. The veil appeared with the decline of Islam. Therefore, the 
most radical reform required was the one concerning the position of women.35 He 
claimed that such a reform was necessary in order for Albanians to be included 
                                                 
32 Schmidt-Neke, op.cit., pp. 335-336. 
33 M. Frashëri, Historia e lashtë e Shqipërisë dhe e Shqipëtarëve, Tirana 2000 (1928
1
), pp. 44-45 
and 46-47. 
34 “Reformat Myslimane në Shqipëri,” in Gazeta e re (Tiranë), n°17, 20/11/1928, p. 1 ; n°26, 
1/12/1928, p. 2 ; n°27, 2/12/1928, p. 4 ; n°30, 6/12/1928, p. 2 ; n°31, 7/12/1936, p. 3 ; n°35, 
12/12/1928, p. 2 ; n°36, 13/12/1929, p. 2 ; n°37, 14/12/1937, p. 2 ; n°39, 16/12/1928, p. 2. 
35 Mehdi Frashëri also suggested making other reforms concerning the way of performing prayers 
and the diffusion of knowledge. In a later article, published in 1931, concerning the economic 
situation of the country and the lack of development of agriculture, he suggested that one of the 
factors was that the Islamic religion was humiliating women in numerous ways (“Aveniri I 
Shqipërisë në pikpamje bujqësore,” in Bujqsija, III/1-2, January-February 1931, p. 17). 
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among “European people.” Since Albanians wanted to live free, independent and 
advanced lives, Mehdi Frashëri saw only two solutions for Albanian Muslims who 
represented the part of the Muslim world that was face to face with Christian 
people : either make reforms or Islam would have to disappear from the face of 
Albania.36 Only radical reforms like those of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey could 
bring civilization and independence, as the Christian people experienced four 
centuries before, with the Protestant reform. 
At that time, Mehdi Frashëri was preparing new legislation covering all 
fields, including family law, previously covered by the Shari‟a courts. Thus, his 
approach to the reform of Islam had another important aspect : that of religious 
authority. In fact, in the same article,37 he advocated returning to the sources 
without the intermediary of an authority, in accordance with Luther‟s principle. 
Moreover, he claimed that even some features of the Islamic religion urged him to 
follow this line. Indeed for Mehdi Frashëri, the Prophet himself did not assume 
authority ; and Islam, as a general principle, opted to have no clergy. Because the 
educational level of the clerics was too low, and until the arrival of a new 
educated generation, clerics should confine themselves to the practice of religion, 
whereas the Muslim councils established all over the country should be made up 
of educated people, doctors, lawyers, agronomists, professors, etc. Mehdi Frashëri 
went so far in this direction, that he proposed a totally new training for muftis. He 
stated that all the country‟s madrasas should be closed, and replaced by the 
establishment of two colleges (one in the South, the other in the North), with a 
new educational system where Arabic should be taught according to the American 
Berlitz method. The best students should be sent to Europe to study philosophy, as 
well as the Arabic language in the departments of foreign languages. On their 
return, they should be appointed muftis, since, in Islam, those who are more 
learned are in a better position to interpret the texts and since muftis do not need 
to wear turbans and jubes. 
 
The „Ulama 
It is easy to understand that people holding religious authority reacted to a 
debate in which Islam was often disparaged and their authority challenged. They 
were also reacting to the measures taken by the state and its representatives to ban 
                                                 
36 Mehdi Frashëri considered that the other Balkan Muslims, who were under the domination of 
the Balkan states, were condemned to emigrate to Anatolia. 
37 See footnote 34. 
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the veil. However the reactions were expressed in various ways, often depending 
on the social position of those concerned. 
A first group of Muslim clerics was made up of the leaders of the Islamic 
Community, i.e. of the official religious institutions. These people were 
themselves reformists. For instance, in 1925, when a national Islamic Congress 
was convened, they declared that Albania was taking part in the “revival” of 
Islamic civilization inaugurated by Muhammad Abduh. They wanted to introduce 
reforms in order to achieve culture, civilization and progress. As a result, the 
political authorities looked favourably on them. Nevertheless they only had a 
limited room to manœuvre vis-à-vis these political authorities, and when they had 
differences of opinion with them, especially when reforms implied restrictions to 
their own authority, they had great difficulty imposing their view.38 They 
themselves did not form a totally homogeneous group. For instance, in 1926, 
when the students of Tirana‟s madrasa asked for authorization to create a sports 
association, only one member of the High Council of the Shari‟a was in favour of 
this idea.39  
The attitude of the leaders of the Islamic Community concerning the veil had 
been fluctuating according to their place in the debate and in the process. Until 
1929, they generally defended the veil, or at least opposed criticism against it 
using two arguments – a woman‟s honour and religious authority.40 In 1929 and in 
1937, when official measures were taken concerning the ban on the veil, the 
leaders of the Islamic Community were supposed to have taken the initiative, but, 
as I have argued, this does not seem very plausible. In 1929, the argument they 
used to justify the measures taken by the civil authorities, was that the wearing of 
the veil was not a Qur‟anic prescription and that the Islamic religion did not insist 
on covering the face. Some months later, the Islamic Community published in its 
journal the translation of a lecture given in the Berlin mosque on a woman‟s 
position in Islam. Here again the interpretation of the Qur‟an, inspired by the 
                                                 
38 It was particularly the case when the jurisdiction of Shari‟a judges were limited in 1919 and 
when the Civil Code was introduced in 1928-1929. 
39 AQSH, F. 882, V. 1926, D. 71, fl. 1-2. This member was Salih Vuçitërn, a figure who belonged 
both to the religious and to political field. 
40 In 1924, the mufti of Shkodër criticized the idea put forward in Catholic newspaper to ban the 
veil (see footnote 28), because it undermined Islam, and stated that if the Catholics committed a 
second offence, there would be a quarrel between the two “elements” (Zani i naltë, I/11, August 
1924, p. 348). Reacting to the same affair, the Muslim editors of the newspaper Dajti in Tiranë 
explained that the veil was one of the fundamental means of preserving a woman‟s honour (Dajti, 
n°45, 17/9/1924, p. 3). As we will see below, in 1928, the answer of Hafiz Ismet Dibra to Mehdi 
Frashëri mainly concerned the question of religious authority.   
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leader of the Lahori Ahmadiyya, Muhammad Ali, led to the conclusion that 
uncovering of a woman‟s face and hands was lawful.41  
When the veil debate livened up again in the press in 1936, as representatives 
of the Islamic Community, they choose above all to defend the Islamic religion 
and, for that, to denounce the criticisms made against the veil, since it was 
associated by their adversaries with Islam. In the Community‟s journal, they 
denounced the idea that the veil – and the Islamic religion – was the cause of the 
lack of progress of the Albanian nation and accused their adversaries of wanting to 
force Albanian women to live in excessive luxury. In doing so, they inevitably 
appeared all the more as the champions of the veil. Yet, relying on the Qur‟an, the 
article concluded that a woman could go out with her face unveiled, but without 
any make-up, and with a cloak (jilbab) leaving only the face and the hands 
uncovered.42 It shows the ambiguity of their discourse. 
With the decision of the political authorities to impose the ban on the veil at 
the beginning of 1937, the leaders of the Islamic Community were placed in a 
different position. Again they had to justify, at the religious level, such a decision 
and even to appear to promote it. The arguments presented in these new 
circumstances were in fact of various types.43 Some were of course religious. B. 
Shapati explained that, according to verses 31-32 of Surat XXIV of the Qur‟an, a 
woman had to be covered in front of foreigners. But according to Imam Azam, 
this prescription excluded the face and hands. All the Hanafi „ulama preached this 
interpretation. Later on, because of the problems that appeared in Muslim 
societies, Muslim jurists had prohibited women from showing their face.44 
According to fiqh books, a Muslim woman had the right to work outside the 
home, to trade, to be a witness at the court, etc. Then B . Shapati wrote :  
“Ibn Abidin said that the fact that a free woman shows her face is not haram [unlawful], 
but it is not necessary, it is meqruh [not forbidden by God, but looked upon by Muslim 
teachers with disgust] ; According to this prescription, we issue the following fatwa : The 
foreigner, Zeyd, when he sees the face of a foreign woman, Hindi, is it haram ? Answer : it is 
not haram.”45  
                                                 
41 “Gjendja e Grues n‟Islamizmë,” Zani i naltë, VI/4, March 1930, pp. 966-976. 
42 “Zbulimi u Grues Muslimane,” Zani i naltë, XI/5, May 1936, pp. 142-149. One of the  
arguments used against their adversaries was also that the latter wanted the unveiling only because 
of the shame vis-à-vis foreigners. So they accused the secularist intellectuals of wanting “to destroy 
the country in order to please the foreigners.”  
43 Zani i naltë, XII/3, March 1937, pp. 65-77. 
44 B. Shapati argued that some regions, in particular mountainous areas, continued to observe the 
true prescriptions of the Prophet and did not veil women. Thus, for nationalists, mountainous areas  
appeared as the bastion of tradition. 
45 Ibid. 
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Apart from the religious justification, the leaders of the Islamic Community 
also used the rhetoric of the civil authorities, and eventually that of the secularist 
intellectuals they had opposed. They presented abandoning the veil as a “social 
measure.” They explained that its main aim was to improve the position of 
Muslim women within Albanian society, because the fatherland needed such an 
investment of women in social life in order to achieve, as soon as possible, the 
level of cultural progress and economic development of a civilized country. 
Moreover, they did not forget to mention that the measure was taken just at the 
time when the King promised a set of reforms. 
Like the secularist intellectuals, their arguments were also structured round 
the question of perception. The veil had become a problem because it was misused 
by some people, and, because it was considered as a prescription of the Islamic 
religion, the result was a criticism of the Islamic religion itself. Abandoning the 
veil was therefore necessary to enlighten the true nature of Islam in the mind of 
public opinion. The fact that Albanians, particularly Muslims, wore different 
clothes made others laugh at them. Every day, “foreign tourists” were taking 
photographs of Muslim women, showing them to the rest of the world as 
testimony to the barbarian nature of the Muslim religion. Just like the secularist 
intellectuals, the leaders of the Islamic Community declared lastly that in the 20
th
 
century and in the middle of Europe Albanians had to adapt themselves to all the 
“good customs” of the civilized nations. 
 
In this way, urged on by the political authorities, the leaders of the Islamic 
Community, henceforth seemed to agree with the young religious Muslims sent to 
Lahore (India), who had expressed a different position during the debate in 1936. 
This small group of future „ulama, who were not yet involved in the leadership of 
religious affairs, had published at that time an article about the veil in their small 
journal – a supplement to the journal of the Lahori Ahmadiyya, The Light.46 Like 
the leaders of the Islamic Community, the authors criticized those who wanted 
unlimited freedom for women to mix with any foreigner. They also drew the same 
conclusions from the analysis of the Qur‟an, which they considered as giving the 
principles of religion and civilization : there was no prescription concerning the 
                                                 
46 Sherif Putra, “Moda e mbulesës dhe veçimi i grave,” in Drita (Lahore), n°6-8, June-July-August 
1936, pp. 6-19. In fact, this text was a translation of an article written by the head of the Lahori 
Ahmadiyya, Muhammad Ali, and published in 1905 in The Review of Religions. This appears in 
the second part of the text which was published in the journal of the Albanian Islamic Community 
in 1937, after the ban on the veil (Zani i naltë, XII/5, May 1937, pp. 202-213). 
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covering of the face and the hands. However, they seemed to hold an opposite 
position in the debate. Indeed, they were convinced that the progress of Muslims 
was closely related to “solving the problem of the veil.” Like the secularist 
intellectuals, they even declared that the veil was responsible for the educational 
backwardness of Muslim women. 
But the real difference was between the leaders of the Islamic Community 
and other „ulama who were against lifting the veil. These people did not use the 
press or any printed matter to express themselves in public space. Nevertheless, 
we know that the leaders of the Islamic Community had to face opposition from 
such „ulama, which they tried to hide47. In fact, a blurred frontier existed between 
these „ulama and those belonging to the official Community who only reluctantly 
accepted the lifting of the veil. But the „ulama who opposed the ban on the veil 
had been against both the other reforms (introduction of the Civil Code and 
closing down of Shari‟a courts and local madrasas) and the new religious 
hierarchy close to the political power. Apart from their real opinion concerning the 
veil, it provided a good opportunity to oppose the fatwa and the law.  
It would have been interesting to know how a reformist „ulama like Hafiz 
Abdullah Zëmblaku, who choose to have no relations with the authorities and who 
remained outside the new religious institutions, reacted in the 1937‟s debate. A 
former reader of the Turkish Islamist journals Beyanülhak and Sebilürreşad, in the 
1920s he took as a model the missionaries of the Lahori Ahmadiyya, with whom 
he was in contact. He claimed to have the same objectives as this network : to 
make accessible to everybody the religious prescriptions and texts in vernacular 
languages, to work against the superstitions that entered into religion, to defend 
the Shari‟a and to reinforce the bonds between Muslims, to show that Islam was a 
modern religion and that the clerics were also acting on the path to civilization, as 
well as to oppose the intense activity of Christian missionaries. That is why he 
worked for the teaching of religion and true beliefs in the Albanian language, 
through courses, preaching and a set of booklets. He even invented a transcription 
of the Arabic language in Latin script in order to make it more accessible.48 
We know that at the beginning of 1938 Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku was 
confined by the political authorities in the city of Vlorë, but we do not know the 
                                                 
47 Whereas a report from Elbasan shows that there were opponents (AQSh, F. 882, V. 1937, D. 88, 
fl.1), the journal of the Islamic Community published a false report showing that there was no 
opposition to unveiling (Zani i naltë, XII/3, March 1937, p. 96). 
48 See, for example, H.A. Sëmlaku, Bilbil i gjashtë. Kanarja, 1930, Korçë, p. 41-43, Bilbil i shtatë, 
1931, Korçë, p. 15, 24-26, Bilbil i tetë, Korçë, 1931, p. 15-21.  
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reason for this.49 Some years before, however, he seems to have had an 
intermediary position on the question of the veil, between the young students in 
Lahore and the leaders of the Islamic Community. He criticized those who were 
against the veil, as well as those who were in favour of it for the wrong reasons. 
He considered that religious prescriptions obliged a woman to wear a complete 
veil, but that the old ferexhe was not necessary ; a modern thick coat was much 
better, with a headscarf (shami) on the head and a kind of shawl.50 Three years 
later, like the leaders of the Islamic Community, he appeared to deny the right of 
newspapers to address the question of the veil which he saw as an issue that 
concerned only the „ulama, thus reducing the debate to the question of the 
religious authority.51   
Therefore, we can see that multiple issues appeared throughout the debate 
and the way the question was tackled by the different categories of actors.  
 
 
The stakes behind the veil 
In the first place, it is clear that the debate and the measures concerning the 
veil had their climax when political and social events or crisis occurred : at key 
moments in the state building process, at times when the country‟s sovereignty 
was questioned, and during economical and social crises. Whereas Islam was a 
mean of social control for the political authorities against the spread of 
Communist ideology in society, notably among young people, the question of the 
veil had a particular meaning. In 1937 it became a tool of foreign policy deployed 
to assert Albania‟s sovereignty. However, because it symbolized the 
“modernization” and “europeanization” of the country for secularist intellectuals 
and civil servants, the ban was also a sign given to these groups and to the rest of 
society that the state building process was progressing. So they had to be faithful 
to the country and the government. More generally, the problem of the 
relationship between religion and state was crucial. 
 
 
                                                 
49 H.A. Sëmlaku, Kanar I ri dhe bilbili faqe bardhë, Korçë, 1938, p. 5. 
50 So it is unclear whether he considered that the face had to be covered or not (H.A. Sëmlaku, 
Trëndafil i 1, Korçë, 1932, pp. 169-170. 
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State and religion 
Throughout these debates and measures, the relationship between state and 
religion appeared repeatedly. In 1923, when the ban on the veil was discussed in 
parliament along with the prohibition of polygamy, some deputies reacted saying 
that such decisions could not be taken by the Assembly and that the government 
had no right to intervene in religious affairs. Time and education would resolve 
the problem. Others believed in duty of parliament and the state to take care of the 
cultural and social development of the nation and thus to solve this kind of 
question. Using a juridical approach, Mehdi Frashëri sided with the former 
(claiming that parliament had no authority in religious matters), but explained that 
other questions, such as the equality between women and men before the court, 
and inheritance and divorce, could be debated by the Assembly.52 In the following 
years, the Albanian government did in fact adopt the latter position and often 
interfered in religious affairs, by directing, controlling or using the religious scene, 
as illustrated by the question of the veil. That is why we can say that the Albanian 
state was multi-denominational rather a-denominational. There was no separation 
of state and church as, at least theoretically, in France. But, as in Turkey, only the 
government could combine religion with politics.53 The difference with Turkey 
was that, despite Albania‟s Muslim majority in demographic terms, the state did 
not give the nation a Muslim character, which means that there arose the question 
of the plurality of confessional groups.  
The problem of building a nation out of several denominational groups 
appears clearly in the arguments put forward by Mehdi Frashëri in his famous 
article of 1928 on the reforms of Islam. For him, Albania‟s fate was linked to the 
progress of the Muslim community, since it formed the majority of the population. 
In order to achieve a true and non superficial union of the different parts of the 
nation, which was a question of survival for a small nation like Albania, the 
Muslim majority had to be liberal. At the same time Mehdi Frashëri thought that 
abandoning Shari‟a-based jurisprudence was necessary not only because this was 
                                                                                                                                     
51 See below.  
52 Bisedimet e këshillit Kombtar, viti III, n°4, Tiranë 1923, pp. 49-57. 
53 See H. Bozarslan, “Islam, laïcité et la question d‟autorité de l‟Empire ottoman à la Turquie 
kémaliste,” in Archives de sciences sociales des religions, n°125, January-March 2004, pp. 99-112.  
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an “old-fashioned” legislation and because religion concerned the consciousness 
and legislation of the state, but also because the Albanian people was made up of 
non-Muslims as well as Muslims.54 Like Mehdi Frashëri himself, people who 
were not Sunni Muslims (e.g. Bektashis or Christians) had of course a specific 
position towards the former dominant religion. They wanted it to loose its 
hegemonic status, and demanded for more rights for other denominational 
groups.55  
In the course of the debate, the question of the secularization of public space 
also arose, since the veil was generally considered as a mark of the Islamic 
religion. Secularist intellectuals, as well as a lot of officials and political leaders, 
seem to have been extremely sensitive to this, also because for them 
“secularization” was synonymous with “de-ottomanization” and “modernization”. 
All marks of Ottoman domination, often mistaken for marks of Islam, were to be 
banned, leading to a certain depreciation of Islam. Public space was partially de-
islamized, especially in schools and in the administration, but also in urban space, 
even if the state itself contributed to the building of some mosques during the 
interwar period. Consequently, the context was not that of the re-islamization of 
the public sphere and “disillusioned secularization” that characterize Western 
Europe today.56 
Another difference with the current situation in some European countries is 
that the school was not the main theatre of the public sphere involved in the 
debate on the veil. In Albania at that time, the percentage of girls attending school 
was rather low ; veiled girls were simply not sent to school.57 However, apart from 
the veil, the separation of religion and education, which was an important facet of 
state politics, notably through the question of religious teachings, became a 
subject of polemics. Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku, for instance, saw the state, and 
particularly the Ministry of Education, as enemies of religion and promoters of 
unbelief. He considered them as “Young Turks” and “Free-Masons.” He himself 
had a lot of trouble with the authorities which banned him from teaching the 
                                                 
54 See reference in footnote 34. Here the difference between the Albanian and the Turkish case has 
to be stressed. In Albania, the non-Muslim minorities were larger (approximately 30% of the 
population), and most of the non-Muslims were also ethnic Albanians.   
55 In 1923, as well as in 1929, the question of relations between the Islamic Community and the 
Bektashis was at the heart of the question of religion and state. 
56 The expression is from Jocelyne Césari and Jean Baubérot (“Laïcité, communautarisme et 
foulard : vrais et faux débats,” http://lmsi.net). 
57 Musaj, op.cit., p. 142. 
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Albanian language, because he taught it together with religion.58 Here we can 
perceive of course the problem of the loss of legitimacy for clerics in the 
educational sphere, mentioned above. As a result, the journal of the Islamic 
Community strongly denounced the role of teachers in propagating atheism and 
bolshevism.59 But, for Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku, even the head of the Islamic 
Community, who sided with the political authorities, was an enemy of religion 
and a promoter of unbelief. The religious authority in itself was thus also 
questioned. 
 
Religious authority 
The question of religious authority came up in the debate on the veil firstly 
because the ban on the veil was considered as one of the key reforms of Islam to 
be implemented and because some of the actors raised the following questions : 
who is able to debate about Islam ? who can decide on reforms ?, and who can 
lead them ?  
I already pointed out that the leaders of the Islamic Community very often 
used the argument of religious authority to answer opponents of the veil. In 1928, 
when one of the leaders of the Islamic Community, Hafiz Ismet Dibra, had to 
answer the long article by Mehdi Frashëri, he answered not directly to him, but to 
“the Muslims who wonder after reading Mehdi‟s Frashëri on the reforms of 
Islam.” Moreover, instead of criticizing the point of view of his adversary, H.I. 
Dibra first denied his authority in the field of religion, pointing out all his 
“mistakes” as proof of his incompetence. In particular, Mehdi Frashëri‟s tendency 
to imagine an ijtihad (rational interpretation) out of context of the Shari‟a, as well 
as his failure to show signs of respect towards the Prophet, were considered 
unacceptable.60 Such an answer, in fact, followed the same line as that of Mehdi 
Frashëri, since the latter had advocated returning to the sources without the 
intermediary of an authority, proposing to establish Islamic councils composed of 
laymen and to train new muftis using modern educational methods, as we have 
                                                 
58 See, for example, H.A. Sëmlaku, Bibil i Fesë. Sheri-ati Muhamedija, Korçë, 1930, pp. 77-79 
and Trëndafil i 1, Korçë, 1932, pp. 83 and 96 ss. 
59 See, for example, “Kundër Ateizmit,” in Zani i naltë, XI/8-9, August-September 1936, pp. 287-
290. 
60 Zani i naltë, V/10-11, August-September [November] 1928, p. 678-690 ; V/12, December 1928, 
pp. 726-734. H.I. Dibra even pointed out an incompetence of his adversary in his own field : 
diplomacy. 
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seen.61 In the same way, in 1935, Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku explained that, since 
the Kingdom had no official religion, religion was free and nobody had the right 
to meddle with religious matters, except the religious scholars. Thus, he urged the 
journalists to speak about the economy rather than religion.62  
The secularist intellectuals were really challenging the religious authority 
because of their direct access to the Qur‟an through translations63 and their 
constant attacks on Islam, but also because of widespread ignorance among 
Muslim clerics. This led some Muslims to react by proposing a plan to train 
clerics capable of guiding people with an Eastern as well as a Western culture, and 
more generally to launch reforms based on ijtihad.64      
Furthermore, the question of the veil reveals that the authority of the leaders 
of the Islamic Community was not only challenged by secularist intellectuals but 
also by some religious entrepreneurs. The new religious hierarchy had difficulty 
gaining recognition from all the country‟s Muslims. Some „ulama were unwilling 
to accept the reforms which the Community had agreed to implement in close 
collaboration with the civil authorities, or to accept the new hierarchy and the 
centralization of the religious authorities. Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku, for example, 
had refused a position of mufti. A lot of „ulama in Shkodër went on teaching in a 
traditional way, without any contact with the new Tirana Madrasa. Most of them 
considered the introduction of the Civil Code and the ban on the veil as being in 
conflict with the Shari‟a.65 
 
Europe as reference or towards a “European Islam” 
Despite the opposition, if we analyze the content of the whole debate, it is 
striking to see “Europe” appearing as a common reference for all the actors, 
                                                 
61 Later on, in July 1938, Mehdi Frashëri gathered Muslim intellectuals in the Albanian capital, in 
order to help the cultural development of the “Muslim element” (Zani i naltë, n°8, August 1938, p. 
255). 
62 Bilbili besëtar, Korçë, 28 September 1935, pp. 51-52. 
63 A first partial translation of the Qur‟an had been made by a Christian Albanian (1st fascicle, 
Bucarest, 1921 ; 2d fascicle, Korçë, 1928). In addition, an English translation and commentary by 
Muhammad Ali, from the Ahmadiyya, was circulating in the country. 
64 “Persri mbi fonksionarët t‟onë fetarë,” in Zani i naltë, August-September 1930, pp. 1121-1126. 
65 See, for example, the great debate about the required reforms which started in 1927, whose 
echoes are to be found in the journal of the Islamic Community (Zani i naltë). After this period, the 
only criticism expressed towards the leaders of the Islamic Community through printed matter was 
that of Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku, but it certainly points to a broader opposition. 
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whatever their position concerning the veil.66 In fact, the relationship between 
Islam and Europe was at the heart of the debate. The Islam shaped by all the actors 
was not only an Islam in Europe. In the Paris mosque, in 1930, Ilyas Vrioni, the 
Albanian Ambassador, presented his country as “a fortress of the Islamic 
traditions in Europe”.67 But it was also a “European Islam.” For the secularists, as 
we have seen, the reform of Islam had to be carried out precisely because the 
country was situated in Europe. On the other side, Hafiz Ismet Dibra, one of the 
leading „ulama of the official Community, agreed with Mehdi Frashëri that 
Muslims, although a majority in Albania, would not be able to live and to retain 
their faith, without accepting the principles of “modern” and “European” life. In 
particular, in order to live in the middle of Europe it was necessary for them to 
make their own all kind of sciences that were the product of progress. 
Consequently the reform of Islam was essential.68 
Nevertheless, it seems that the position of the various actors was not exactly 
the same vis-à-vis this reference. For the secularist intellectuals or state 
representatives, the reference was always positive, whereas for the „ulama, it 
could be positive or negative. The „ulama used it when they wanted something 
from the government, when they answered the secularists or when they wanted to 
convince Muslims about the need for reforms. Thus, they often mentioned that 
European states had realized again the importance of religion, had strengthen the 
teaching of religion at school or hosted religious Congresses. They pointed to the 
fact that even developed countries did not prevent their people from being 
“fervent believers”. Even Abdullah Zëmblaku, when he was criticized for using 
too many Arabic words, argued that, in Europe too, Arabic words had been 
incorporated into the language.69 In this way they were highlighting out European 
realities that the secularists and Westernists did not refer to. However, when the 
„ulama tried to revalorize Islam, they could oppose “Europe” to “Islam” in a 
negative way for the former and a positive way for the latter. In this case, Europe 
became « materialist », the seat of unbelief, of women‟s dishonour, of luxury and 
frivolity.70 The official Islamic hierarchy, through its journal, denounced the “new 
                                                 
66 Here, of course, I cannot take into account the adversaries of the ban on the veil who did not 
take part in the debate through printed matter. 
67 AQSh, F. 882, V. 1930, D. 114. 
68 See reference in footnote 60. There was never a debate about darülharb and darülislam. 
69 See, for example, “Veprimet e Këshillit të Naltë të Sheriatit dhe nevojat e trupit musliman,” in 
Zani i naltë, II/3, Maj 1925, pp. 459-464 ; “Bisedimet e Kongresit Muslyman,” in Zani i naltë, 
II/4-5, June-July 1925, p. 502 ; Hafiz Ali Kraja, op.cit. ; H.A. Sëmlaku, Trëndafil i 1, Korçë, 1932, 
p. 154.   
70 See, for example, “Zbulimi u Grues Muslimane,” in Zani i naltë, XI/5, May 1936, pp. 142-149. 
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trends with a European influence”, the  “Oksidentalofilë” (those who loved the 
West).71  
Another important reference in the debate was Turkey, as was the case 
throughout the Muslim world at that time.72 The reforms of Mustafa Kemal were 
quoted as an example by the secularists and the state representatives.73 On one 
hand, the leaders of the Islamic Community, probably with the aim of convincing 
the political authorities, explained that Mustafa Kemal was not against Islam.74 
But someone like Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku could criticized the “Young Turks” 
and the “masons” of Turkey, as bad examples for the Muslim world, while 
criticizing the state representatives as well as the leaders of the Islamic 
Community.75  
On the other hand, references to the Arab World (or to India) posed problems, 
and arguments based on such a reference were violently rejected by secularist 
intellectuals.76 Even the Arabic script and the Arabic language were stigmatized 
by the secularists as well as by the state representatives. The political authorities 
tried to ban prayers (dua) in Arabic from the public sphere, arguing that it could 
make a bad impression on foreigners ; that the people had to understand what they 
were hearing ; and finally, that it was contrary to the independence of the Albanian 
Islamic Community.77 This last point shows that the authorities, as in France 
today, were faced with the problem of “domestication in a global religious 
field”.78  
 
Albanian Islam and external networks 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 See Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen and Anne-Laure Dupont (eds.), Débats intellectuels au Moyen-
Orient dans l‟entre-deux-guerres,  REMMM, n°95-96-97-98, 2002. 
73 In the religious field, the Turkish model could even be followed very concretely. Thus, in 1928, 
the Albanian ambassador in Ankara sent a collection of khutbas for translation into Albanian 
because, “it fitted with the religious principles and to the need of the time”. The book was 
translated as Këshillet e së premtes (Shkodër, 1928). 
74 See, for example, “Vepra e Gazi Qemal Ataturkut,” in Zani i naltë, X/3, March 1935, pp. 81-84 
; “Përsëri Mustafa Kemali flet mbi maltësinë e Islamizmës…,” in Zani i naltë, X/9-10, September-
October 1935, pp. 319-320.  
75 Trëndafil i 1, Korçë, 1932, p. 120.   
76 See, for example, the article “Zani I naltë kundra Qytetnimit,” published in Bota e re (n°20, 
30/1/ 1937), where the author, Selim Shpuza, criticized the journal of the Islamic Community for 
having quoted the discourse of an Arab shaykh of Al-Azhar (Selim Shpuza, Vitet ‟20-‟30, Tiranë, 
1999, pp. 146-151). 
77 AQSh, F. 882, v. 1926, D. 90, fl. 1-2.  
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During the inter-war period, many Albanian entrepreneurs were in contact 
with the outside Muslim world : with Turkey, Egypt, India and with Muslims in 
the Balkans and in the rest of Europe.79 These contacts were used in the local field 
in different ways and for different purposes : to train students, to obtain Islamic 
literature, to benefit from various debates, etc. Apart from their relations with 
Egypt, the leaders of the Islamic Community, in particular, made extensive use of 
their relations with the Lahori-Ahmadi network based in India, as well as in 
Berlin, Vienna or London. From 1927 onwards, they sent students to Lahore and 
ordered the translation of many articles and booklets developing the idea of the 
compatibility between Islam and modernity in order to reply to the arguments of 
those who devalorized Islam and to underline the compatibility of Islam and 
Europe embodied by the activities of the Lahori missions in England or 
Germany.80 Hafiz Abdullah Zëmblaku, although opposed to the Community, also 
justified his “missionary action” in putting forward the work of the Lahori- 
Ahmadi in the Western World and his own contacts with them. He also used their 
networks to disseminate his method of transcription of Arabic.81 
However, it seems that an official networking was not possible, because of 
the principle of nationalization imposed by the state. As early as 1923, the 
decision to break with the Caliphate had been of specific political importance with 
the aim of setting up an independent Islamic Community. Eight years later, when 
the leaders of the Albanian Islamic Community received an invitation to attend the 
Jerusalem Congress, they declined it on the pretext that their Treasury did not 
have sufficient funds to send a representative.82 There was also no delegate from 
Albania at the Geneva Congress of European Muslims held in 1935.83 We have to 
point out that, according to the law, religious communities in Albania could not be 
financed from abroad and could only have spiritual and cultural relations with 
                                                                                                                                     
78 John R. Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders ? Dilemmas of Domestication in a Global 
Religious Field,” in American Anthropologist, 106(1), 2004, pp. 43-55. 
79 A lot of them corresponded with different persons from abroad, the hajj was performed, and 
students were sent to Egypt (some to University and some to Al-Azhar) or even to Lahore.  
80 Nathalie Clayer, “La Ahmadiyya Lahori et la réforme de l‟islam albanais dans l‟entre-deux-
guerres,” in De l‟Arabie à l‟Himalaya. Chemins croisés en hommage à Marc Gaborieau, 
Véronique Bouillier and Catherine Servan-Schreiber (eds.), Paris, 2004, pp. 211-228.  
81 See footnote 48. 
82 AQSh, F. 882, V. 1931, D. 116. 
83 The Albanian participants to these congresses came from Macedonia, i.e. from Yugoslavia. 
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foreign individuals or institutions; correspondence with religious centres situated 
abroad had to be authorized.84 
 
Thus the progressive ban on the veil which occurred in Albania in the 
interwar years reveals different phenomena. In order to build and to gain 
recognition for their state in the “middle of Europe,” and despite – or because of – 
the Muslim majority in the country, Albanian political authorities and secularist 
intellectuals wanted to built a “modern” and “European” Islam. Their action was 
also dictated by a wish for secularization in order to set up a multi-denominational 
nation, but also by the devalorization of Islam among the elites. Some leaders of 
the Islamic Community were also convinced of the need to build a “European 
Islam”, but not exactly in the same way, and not at the expense of a loss of power. 
The most significant result of their action was the appearance of a new religious 
elite promoting an Islam of the Qur‟an and of progress, such as that presented by 
the Lahori Ahmadiyya working at that time in the middle of Europe for the 
promotion of Islam. However, the process of banning the veil shows the 
complexity of building a European Islam “à l‟albanaise”, i.e. a specific approach 
to secularization, a submission of the upper levels of the Islamic official hierarchy 
to the political authorities, a difficulty for this hierarchy to impose itself on all 
Muslims in the country and a limited impact of the reforms within Albanian 
society.  
                                                 
84 See the text of 1923 on the status of the religious Community (AQSh, F. 152, V. 1923, D. 855, 
fl. 15), and Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Nazione e religione in Albania (1920-1944), Bologna 
1990, p. 32.  
